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The most recent set of legislative amendments made to Australian 
insider trading laws resulted from the reforms contained in the 
Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth). Those insider trading 
reforms included changes to the nature of the relevant financial 
products; changes to the type of prohibited conduct; and changes to 
the potential consequences for breaching the prohibition on insider 
trading. This paper will examine in detail the reforms made to the law 
of insider trading, consider their effect to date on insider trading in 
Australia, and identify remaining gaps and inconsistencies in the law 
which are yet to be effectively addressed. 
   
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth)1 had a lengthy genesis. The process 
commenced in June 1996, with the Financial Services Inquiry chaired by Mr Stan 
Wallis – various reforms concerning the financial services industry were suggested 
by the ‘Wallis Inquiry’. Then, in December 1997, the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program’s sixth policy paper was released – it was titled ‘Financial Markets 
and Investment Products: Promoting Competition, Financial Innovation and 
Investment’ and became known as ‘CLERP 6’. Following the receipt of 
submissions on the CLERP 6 policy paper, the CLERP Consultation Paper 
‘Financial Products, Service Providers and Markets – An Integrated Framework’ 
was released on 3 March 1999. This led to the preparation and release of the first 
exposure draft bill and accompanying commentary in February 2000, which 
eventually gave rise to the FSR Act itself. As stated in the Explanatory 
Memorandum, the purpose of the various reforms was to: 
 
                                                 
*  Lecturer, Department of Business Law, Division of Law, Macquarie University. This paper is 
based on a presentation given by the author at the ‘Financial Services Reform Third 
Anniversary – Where Next?’ conference, held in Sydney on 13 July 2007.    
1  To be referred to from now as on as the ‘FSR Act’. 
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… put in place a competitively neutral regulatory system which benefits participants 
in the industry by providing more uniform regulation, reducing administrative and 
compliance costs, and removing unnecessary distinctions between products … to 
give consumers a more consistent framework of consumer protection in which to 
make their financial decisions … [and] to facilitate innovation and promote business, 
while at the same time ensuring adequate levels of consumer protection and market 
integrity.2 
 
The FSR Act came into effect on 11 March 2002, with a gradual implementation 
over a two year period. Thus the FSR Act amendments have now been in full effect 
for more than three years. 
   
Although the FSR Act has made many significant changes to the financial services 
industry, this paper will focus on its impact on the laws regulating insider trading. 
In essence, insider trading occurs when a person trades in financial products whilst 
in possession of price-sensitive information which is not publicly available. The 
elements of the insider trading offence can broadly be summarised as follows: 
 
1 a person possesses certain information; 
 
2 the information is not generally available; 
 
3 the person knows (or ought reasonably to know) that the information is not 
generally available; 
 
4 if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect 
it to have a material effect on the price or value of financial products; 
 
5 the person knows (or ought reasonably to know) that if the information were 
generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material 
effect on the price or value of those financial products; and 
 
6 whilst in possession of the information, the person trades in those financial 
products (that is, buys or sells those financial products) or procures another 
person to do so. 
 
This paper will first describe each of the reforms made to insider trading laws by 
the FSR Act. The effect of those reforms on insider trading in Australia will then be 
analysed in detail. This paper will highlight remaining insider trading issues which 
have not yet been effectively dealt with, and will conclude with a comment on 
likely future developments.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2  Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth) - to be referred to from 
now on as the ‘FSR Bill’ - [1.5]. 
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II  NATURE OF FSR ACT INSIDER TRADING REFORMS 
 
Amongst other significant amendments, the FSR Act amended the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth)3 by repealing the old Division 2A Part 7.11 which was entitled ‘Insider 
Trading’4 and inserting a new Part 7.10, Division 3 into Chapter 7 of the 
Corporations Act.5 Three major reforms relating to insider trading arose from these 
amendments: 
 
1 the prohibition on insider trading was extended to apply to all ‘Division 3 
financial products’, not merely securities; 
 
2 the type of conduct prohibited by insider trading laws was widened; and 
 
3 civil penalty proceedings became available for use against alleged insider 
traders. 
 
Thus it can be seen that the FSR Act amendments to insider trading changed the 
nature of the financial products subject to the prohibition, changed the type of 
conduct caught by the prohibition, and changed the potential consequences for 
breaching the prohibition. 
 
A  Extension of Insider Trading Prohibition to all Division 3 Financial Products 
 
The FSR Act changed the nature of the relevant financial products caught by the 
insider trading prohibition. Prior to the implementation of the FSR Act, insider 
trading was prohibited in relation to ‘securities.’ The old s 1002A of the 
Corporations Act provided that: 
 
‘securities’, in relation to a body corporate, means any of the following: 
(a)  shares in the body corporate; 
(b)  debentures (including convertible notes) issued by the body corporate; 
(c)  interests in a managed investment scheme made available by the body 
corporate; 
(d)  units of shares referred to in paragraph (a); 
(e)  an option contract under which a party acquires from another party an option 
or right, exercisable at or before a specified time, to buy from, or sell to, that 
other party a number of securities of a kind referred to in paragraph (a), (b), 
(c) or (d) at a price specified in, or to be determined in accordance with, the 
contract; 
but does not include a futures contract or an excluded security. 
 
Insider trading now applies to all ‘Division 3 financial products’, which are defined 
under s 1042A of the Corporations Act as: 
 
                                                 
3  To be referred to from now on as the ‘Corporations Act’. 
4  Previously Corporations Act ss 1002-1002U. 
5  Part 7.10 Division 3 includes Corporations Act ss 1042A-1044. 
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(a) securities; or 
(b) derivatives; or 
(c) interests in a managed investment scheme; or  
(ca)  debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government; 
or 
(d) superannuation products, other than those prescribed by regulations made for 
the purposes of this paragraph; or  
(e) any other financial products that are able to be traded on a financial market.  
 
Thus certain ‘products’ which were not previously subject to insider trading laws 
have now been brought within the ambit of the prohibition. The reasoning behind 
this reform was the desire to ensure that conduct which amounts to an offence in 
relation to certain financial products should not, from a policy perspective, be 
permissible in relation to other financial products – especially given the aim of the 
FSR Bill to regulate ‘functionally similar’ financial products in a similar manner.6 
All financial products that are tradable on a market (and some which are not) are 
now subject to the prohibition on insider trading.    
 
B  Widening of Type of Conduct Caught by the Insider Trading Prohibition 
 
The FSR Act changed the type of conduct prohibited by insider trading laws. The 
old 1002G (2) of the Corporations Act previously provided that a person in 
possession of ‘inside information’ must not: 
 
(a) subscribe for, purchase or sell, or enter into an agreement to subscribe for, 
purchase or sell, any such securities; or 
(b) procure another person to subscribe for, purchase or sell, or to enter into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell, any such securities. 
 
Since the implementation of the FSR Act, the new s 1043A(1) of the Corporations 
Act now provides that the ‘insider’ must not:  
 
(a) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or 
enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 
3 financial products; or  
(b) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose 
of, relevant Division 3 financial products. 
  
Interestingly, there is no commentary in the Explanatory Memorandum explaining 
the motivation behind the decision to change the description of the prohibited 
conduct. It is now prohibited to ‘acquire or dispose’ of the relevant financial 
products, rather than just ‘purchase or sell’ them – although it is difficult to consider 
this as anything other than just the substitution of alternative synonyms. However, it 
is also prohibited to ‘apply for’ rather than merely ‘subscribe for’ such products 
                                                 
6  Explanatory Memorandum, FSR Bill, [2.76]. 
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and, as previously, it is prohibited to enter into an agreement to do any of these acts 
as well.  
 
The phrase ‘apply for’ is broader in construction than its predecessor ‘subscribe for’ 
and should therefore encompass a greater scope of conduct. ‘Applying for’ 
securities would encompass a subscription for securities, but not necessarily vice 
versa. The term ‘apply for’ also arguably includes the making of offers and the 
entry of a bid offer on SEATS7 for the purchase of securities,8 and would therefore 
now avoid an outcome such as that in R v Evans & Doyle.9   
 
In that case, Mr Evans (a director of MPI Ltd, an unlisted mining company) became 
aware of the discovery of certain mineral deposits near property owned by Mt 
Kersey NL, a listed mining company. MPI Ltd planned to issue a media release 
about the discovery of the mineral deposits on 20 November 1995. Mr Evans 
telephoned Mr Doyle, a stockbroker, and instructed him to buy shares in Mt Kersey 
NL on his behalf at the time he expected the media announcement to be released. 
Mr Doyle immediately placed the order on SEATS and, as a result, approximately 
100,000 shares were later purchased for Mr Evans. Unknown to either party, the 
planned media release did not occur until later in the day. Both Mr Evans and Mr 
Doyle were prosecuted for insider trading. In an unfortunate drafting error, the 
prosecution had prepared the relevant particulars of the indictment so that the only 
acts complained of were those of the client placing the call to the broker and the 
broker placing the buy order on SEATS.  
 
His Honour, McDonald J, determined that, in accordance with the construction of 
the old s1002G(2) of the Corporations Act, neither act constituted the subscription 
for securities, the purchase of securities, or an agreement to subscribe for or 
purchase securities, and therefore that the offence of insider trading could not be 
made out. As a result, the jury was instructed to return a verdict of ‘not guilty’. 
McDonald J stated that the act of instructing a broker to purchase securities does 
not amount to ‘an agreement to purchase … securities and only amounts to an 
agency agreement between the broker and instructing client.10 Accordingly, he 
found that there is no agreement to purchase securities until the broker concludes an 
agreement with a selling broker on behalf of his or her client. Although there was a 
later concluded agreement, this did not fall within the ambit of the indictment.11 
 
                                                 
7  The Stock Exchange Automated Trading System, which facilitates online trading. 
8  Simon Rubenstein, ‘The Regulation and Prosecution of Insider Trading in Australia: Towards 
Civil Penalty Sanctions for Insider Trading’ (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 
89, 111. 
9  R v Evans & Doyle [1999] VSC 488 (15 November 1999), to be referred to from now on as the 
‘Evans and Doyle case’. 
10  The Evans and Doyle case [51]. 
11  Interestingly, a later application to amend the particulars of the indictment was refused: R v 
Evans & Doyle [1999] VSC 489 (16 November 1999). 
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Whilst ordinarily the placing of a buy order on SEATS will ultimately lead to the 
purchase of securities, which would then fall within the type of conduct which is 
prohibited, the intention and attempt to purchase is arguably also objectionable, 
especially if that is the act which occurs at the time when inside information is 
possessed. 
 
C  Introduction of Civil Penalty Proceedings for Insider Trading 
 
The FSR Act altered the potential consequences for persons found to have breached 
the insider trading prohibition. This was done by extending the operation of the 
Corporations Act civil penalty regime12 to insider trading, as well as to other forms 
of market misconduct.  
 
The civil penalty regime operates as follows: 
 
1 civil, not criminal, rules of evidence and procedure apply to the relevant 
proceedings13 (although it has been stated that the meaning of the words ‘civil 
evidence and procedure rules’ is unclear);14 and 
 
2 matters must be established to the civil standard of proof only – that is, on the 
balance of probabilities – rather than to the criminal standard – that is, 
beyond all reasonable doubt.15  
 
Thus, many of the ‘vagaries’ of a criminal trial can be avoided.16 
 
This gives the ASIC the option of proceeding with civil penalty proceedings itself, 
rather than needing to refer the matter to the Department of Public Prosecutions for 
a criminal prosecution. 
 
If civil penalty proceedings are successful, the potential consequences for a person 
found liable for insider trading are: 
 
1 a pecuniary penalty – that is, a fine – of up to $200,000 for an individual or 
up to $1,000,000 for a corporation;17 
                                                 
12  The civil penalty regime was first introduced by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth) 
and took effect on 1 February 1993.  
13  Corporations Act  s 1317L. 
14  Tom Middleton, ‘The Difficulties of Applying Civil Evidence and Procedure Rules in ASIC’s 
Civil Penalty Proceedings under the Corporations Act’ (2003) 8 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 507.  
15  Corporations Act  s 1332. 
16  Rubenstein, above n 8, 110. 
17  Corporations Act s1317G(1B) provides for such penalties if, pursuant to s 1317G(1A), the 
contravention: (i) materially prejudices the interests of acquirers or disposers of the relevant 
financial products; (ii) materially prejudices the issuer of the relevant financial products or, if 
the issuer is a corporation or scheme, the members of that corporation or scheme; or (iii)is 
serious.  
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2 a compensation order made in favour of the relevant company in which the 
financial products were traded;18 
 
3 a compensation order made in favour of any person who suffers damage as a 
result of the relevant trading;19  and 
 
4 potential disqualification from managing a corporation for whatever period 
the Court considers appropriate.20  
 
The civil penalty regime was primarily introduced in relation to insider trading to 
provide an alternate means of pursuing alleged insider traders, with a greater 
prospect of success. This is well described in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
FSR Bill:  
 
[A] major problem that exists in relation to the market misconduct and insider trading 
provisions, is the difficulty ASIC has in successfully prosecuting a breach of the 
provisions. As the existing provisions are offence provisions, the criminal burden of 
proof (beyond reasonable doubt) applies. ASIC has found it difficult to prove 
elements of the offences beyond reasonable doubt, as many elements refer to the 
defendant’s state of mind. This difficulty may result in cases not being pursued even 
where there has been a breach of the provisions. This is undesirable as it casts the law 
into disrepute, and also threatens the integrity of financial markets. It is therefore 
proposed to make the market misconduct and insider trading provisions civil penalty 
provisions. The application of the civil burden of proof (balance of probabilities) will 
facilitate the bringing of actions for breaches of the provisions. The application of 
civil penalties is likely to act as a deterrent to market misconduct.21      
 
III  EFFECTS OF FSR ACT REFORMS ON INSIDER TRADING 
 
The three FSR Act insider trading reforms have, so far, had varying degrees of 
observable success and influence.  
 
A  Extension of Insider Trading Prohibition to all Division 3 Financial Products 
 
Whilst the enlargement of the scope of ‘products’ to which the insider trading 
prohibition applies has undoubtedly had a significant influence on the compliance 
obligations placed on businesses which operate in the financial services industry 
(the impost of which should not be underestimated) there has been little discernable 
impact in any other respect. For example, there have been no reported instances of 
action being taken or threatened over any alleged insider trading in respect of the 
new ‘class’ of products now caught within the definition. 
 
                                                 
18  Corporations Act s 1317J(2). 
19  Corporations Act s 1317J(3A). 
20  Corporations Act s 206C. 
21  Explanatory Memorandum, FSR Bill, [2.78] to [2.79]. 
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One significant issue which has been given visibility as a result of the FSR Act 
insider trading reforms is the efficacy of applying the insider trading legislation to 
different financial markets, in particular the difficulties which may arise in relation 
to ‘over-the-counter’ (or OTC) derivatives. OTC derivatives are traded on the basis 
of ‘principal-to-principal’ contracts entered into off an exchange, which are 
negotiated and documented by sophisticated professional parties to suit their 
particular circumstances, where there is no obligation to make public disclosure.22 
This is to be contrasted with securities traded on an exchange, where the identity of 
the other party is not generally known, and which occur in a market where 
continuous disclosure obligations apply. 
  
Various difficulties have been identified in applying the insider trading prohibition 
to OTC derivative products: 
 
1 it may prevent genuine hedging, which is a common purpose for entry into 
OTC transactions. This is primarily because of knowledge which may be 
possessed by a party seeking to ‘hedge’ against a known risk – which may be 
the knowledge which gives rise to the very desire to hedge. Participants in 
OTC transactions typically engage in them to manage risk exposure rather 
than for the maximization of profits as on standard exchange based 
transactions - for example, they may seek to hedge against movements in 
price, interest rates or exchange rates.23 
 
2 organisations which typically engage in OTC transactions, which were not 
previously subject to the insider trading regime, face significant costs and 
difficulty in ensuring compliance with the new requirements.24 
 
It has been suggested that OTC transactions should be excluded from the insider 
trading regime because, as noted above, the OTC products and transactions are 
significantly different to those of exchange traded products in nature and function.25 
                                                 
22  Julian Donnan, ‘Insider Trading and OTC Derivates under the Financial Services Reform Act’ 
(2003) 14 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 32, 35 and 37; John O’Sullivan, 
‘Derivatives – A Survey of the Law and Practice’ (1994) 5 Journal of Banking and Finance 
Law and Practice 89, 90; Shaun Ansell, ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading in Derivatives’ 
(1995) 13 Company and Securities Law Journal 476, 481. 
23  Donnan, above n 22, 38. 
24  Donnan, above n 22, 38. 
25  Donnan, above n 22, 38. 
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Following an extensive review of insider trading laws, the Corporations and 
Markets Advisory Committee26 released its Insider Trading Report in November 
2003.27 A key recommendation of that report, supported by the majority of the 
Advisory Committee, was that the prohibition should be focused,28 with divergence 
between the majority and minority of the Advisory Committee as to whether there 
should be ‘consequential amendments to meet the circumstances of different 
financial markets’,29 such as specialist OTC markets. CAMAC has indicated an 
understanding of the difficulties associated with applying insider trading laws to 
directly negotiated transactions, such as transactions on OTC markets and 
transactions in securities of unlisted entities. This issue currently remains 
unresolved and is being considered by the Commonwealth Treasury.30 
 
The CAMAC majority proposed to address this issue by amending the prohibition 
on insider trading under s1043A of the Corporations Act so that it only applies if: 
 
(ba) the inside information is disclosable information or announceable 
information.31   
  
New definitions of ‘disclosable information’ and ‘announceable information’ would 
then be added to s1042A of the Corporations Act: 
 
‘disclosable information’ means information that: 
 
(a) has to be disclosed either now or in the future pursuant to any legal or 
regulatory requirement (other than a requirement for disclosure to a 
counterparty) whether or not that obligation is complied with; or 
(b) would come within paragraph (a) were any person subject to the legal or 
regulatory requirement to be aware of the information; or 
(c) would come within paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) if the subject of the 
information came to fruition (whether or not it does so). 
 
‘announceable information’ means information, other than disclosable information, 
that: 
(a) will become the subject of a public announcement; or 
(b) would come within paragraph (a) if the subject matter of the information came 
to fruition (whether or not it does so).32 
 
                                                 
26  To be referred to from now on as the ‘CAMAC’. 
27  This report is available online at: http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/ 
PDFFinal+Reports+2003/$file/Insider_Trading_Report_Nov03.pdf. 
28  Recommendation 38 in the CAMAC Insider Trading Report. 
29  CAMAC Insider Trading Report, 61.  
30  Commonwealth Treasury Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper, March 2007, 
available online at http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=&ContentID=1235. 
31  CAMAC Insider Trading Report, 61. 
32  CAMAC Insider Trading Report, 61-62. 
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The CAMAC minority opposed this recommendation on the basis that any issues 
concerning specialist markets, such as OTC markets, should be addressed by the 
use of appropriate defences or carve-outs tailored to the relevant circumstances.33 
 
The CAMAC minority position is preferred, because it would avoid the insertion of 
further difficult and convoluted definitions into the Corporations Act, which would 
be the result of the majority position recommendation. These provisions carry the 
risk of creating retrospective offences, because it will not necessarily be 
determinable at the time a transaction is entered into whether or not certain 
information is ‘inside information’. As noted in the Commonwealth Treasury 
Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper,34 any element of retrospectivity 
‘undermines the certainty and predictability of the justice system.’ However, the 
minority position lacks any suggested defences or carve-outs for review or 
assessment. 
 
It is worth noting that certain additional amendments were made by the Financial 
Services Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 2002 (Cth) to, in part, address the 
issue of OTC transactions, by amending the ‘own intentions exceptions’ in ss 
1043H-1043J of the Corporations Act. These amendments primarily extended the 
‘own intentions exceptions’ to knowledge of proposed transactions rather than just 
transactions which had already taken place, as well as transactions entered into by 
third parties. However, it is acknowledged that these amendments ‘did not solve the 
inherent problem of applying the … insider trading provisions to all financial 
product transactions’.35   
 
The Commonwealth Treasury has recognised the difficulties associated with this 
issue and has, through its Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper, sought 
submissions on alternative means of dealing with OTC derivative products.36  
 
B  Widening of the Type of Conduct Caught by Insider Trading Prohibition 
 
In common with the reform described above – the extension of the insider trading 
prohibition to all Division 3 financial products – the widening of the type of 
conduct caught by the insider trading prohibition has, so far, had little discernable 
impact on insider trading in a practical sense.  
 
However, it cannot pass without comment that there is arguably a remaining 
loophole within the type of conduct caught by the insider trading prohibition. As 
noted above,37 the reform of the type of conduct prohibited would now arguably 
avoid the same outcome as that in the Evans and Doyle case, because the newly 
                                                 
33  CAMAC Insider Trading Report, 62. 
34  Commonwealth Treasury, above n 30, 18.  
35  Commonwealth Treasury, above n 30, 18. 
36  Issues 5A and 5B, Commonwealth Treasury, Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper, 
above n 30, 20. 
37  At paragraph II B of this paper. 
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inserted phrase ‘apply for’ would now encompass the placing of a ‘buy order’ on 
SEATS, which previously fell outside the relevant definition.  
 
However, what of a ‘sell order’ placed on SEATS? In order for there to be 
‘regulatory neutrality’,38 those who place orders to sell financial products because 
they are in possession of inside information should be in the same legal position as 
those who place orders to buy. The term ‘apply for’ cannot refer to placing a sell 
order and, on the basis of the as yet undisturbed reasoning in the Evans and Doyle 
case, the term ‘dispose of’, which must have almost the same meaning as the 
previously used term ‘sell’, would not cover the placing of a sell order which is not 
yet fulfilled. 
 
The CAMAC suggested in its Insider Trading Report39 that there should be 
clarification of the relevant time when liability arises where trading occurs through 
an intermediary, such as a broker. The CAMAC considers that there are three 
possible points of time in which liability could arise when trading through an 
intermediary: 
 
1 when the intermediary is instructed by the client; 
2 when the intermediary makes an offer on the market on the client’s behalf; or 
3 when the offer is accepted by another trader (which is the point in time which 
was deemed to be relevant in the Evans and Doyle case). 
 
The CAMAC’s recommendation is that, whilst a person should not be liable for 
insider trading unless a transaction ultimately takes place, the relevant time at which 
liability should arise, is when the person instructs an intermediary to act on their 
behalf.40 This would be the time at which the person would be deemed to ‘enter into 
an agreement’ to acquire or dispose of Division 3 financial products. The 
Commonwealth Treasury has indicated that it agrees with this position.41 Once 
legislated, this will hopefully close this existing legal loophole. 
 
C  Introduction of Civil Penalty Proceedings for Insider Trading 
 
The FSR Act reform which has arguably had the most impact on the law regarding 
insider trading is the extension of the civil penalty regime to insider trading and 
market misconduct offences. In particular, two decided cases have already resulted 
from this reform: 
 
1 ASIC v Petsas and Miot;42 and 
 
                                                 
38  A stated aim of the financial services reforms: Australian Treasury Department Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program – Policy Framework (1997). 
39  CAMAC Insider Trading Report, at [1.5]. 
40  Ibid.  
41  Commonwealth Treasury, Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper, above n 30, 6. 
42  (2005) 23 ACLC 269; [2005] FCA 88; to be referred to from now on as the ‘Petsas case’. 
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2 ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd,43 
 
both of which are worthy of some discussion. 
 
1  The Petsas Case 
 
The Petsas case is noteworthy primarily because it was the first set of proceedings 
in which the ASIC made use of the civil penalty regime for insider trading. Briefly, 
Mr Petsas was an employee at ANZ Banking Group, which had been retained by 
BRL Hardy Ltd (BRL) to advise on a confidential merger proposal. On the day Mr 
Petsas became aware of the proposal he provided details to his friend, Mr Miot, and 
they immediately purchased option contracts over BRL shares in Mr Miot’s name, 
for just over $35,000. The next day, the merger discussions were publicly 
announced and the price of BRL shares rose significantly. Mr Miot sold the 
contracts later that day, for a profit of approximately $128,500. A settlement was 
reached, and the parties consented to an order that Mr Petsas and Mr Miot had 
contravened the civil penalty proceedings for insider trading. Mr Petsas and Mr 
Miot were each ordered to pay a fine ($75,000 for Mr Petsas and $65,000 for Mr 
Miot), to return their profit to the other parties to the option contracts, and to pay 
approximately $93,000 in respect of the ASIC’s costs.  
 
Interesting issues which arose from this case were the criteria which His Honour, 
Finkelstein J, considered were relevant to determining the appropriate sentence for 
an insider trader found liable under the new civil penalty proceedings: 
 
(a)  Breach of Trust 
 
The conduct of Mr Petsas was considered to be more serious than that of Mr Miot, 
because of the misuse of information he acquired due to his employment.44 
 
(b)  Sentences for Criminal Convictions 
 
Benchmarks against what would have been a likely sentence if a criminal 
conviction were obtained instead were considered useful. Finkelstein J suggested 
that ‘even a first time offender who pleads guilty [in a criminal prosecution] is 
likely to suffer a term of imprisonment … of between three to six months’45 and 
considered whether it is possible to calculate the monetary value of a term of 
imprisonment, to then be imposed as a fine. Using conversion calculations possible 
under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth),46 his Honour suggested that a fine of $200,00047 is 
                                                 
43  [2007] FCA 963 (28 June 2007); to be referred to from now on as the ‘Citigroup case’. 
44  The Petsas case [11]. 
45  This statement is not necessarily borne out when considering sentences imposed on convicted 
insider traders such as Mr Robert ‘Bart’ Doff, who received only a fine of $30,000 and 350 
hours of community service when convicted of insider trading after pleading ‘not guilty’: R v 
Doff (2005) 23 ACLC 317; [2005] NSWSC 50.  
46  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4B. 
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the equivalent of a life sentence. However, as this formula does not take into 
account the cost to the offender of a criminal conviction – earnings lost whilst in 
prison, the loss of freedom, stigma which attaches to a criminal conviction and the 
future effect on employment and travel48 it is of limited utility. Additionally, it is 
questionable whether it is appropriate to consider the criminal sanctions which 
could have been imposed. If criminal proceedings had been pursued, a conviction 
may not even have been obtained due to the greater burden of proof and stricter 
application of the rules of evidence. Additionally, as civil penalty proceedings are 
an alternative to criminal proceedings, it is arguably not appropriate – having 
elected to pursue a civil penalty – to then refer to the potential consequences of the 
abandoned criminal proceedings.49   
 
(c)  Purpose of Imposing a Civil Penalty  
 
Finkelstein J noted that there are dual purposes for imposing a civil penalty – 
punishment and deterrence.50 This is consistent with the general view of civil 
penalties under the Corporations Act.51 
 
(d)  Conduct of Defendant 
 
Finkelstein J considered that a plea of guilty, which spared the cost of a trial, should 
be taken into account.52   
 
(e)  Personal Circumstances of the Defendant 
 
Personal circumstances, such as a defendant’s employment and likely future ability 
or inability to obtain employment, and expressions of remorse, were considered to 
be relevant considerations.53  
 
Finkelstein J also made some interesting and pertinent comments in relation to the 
conduct of civil penalty proceedings, which he noted ‘… may [now] be chosen by 
the enforcing authority as an express alternative to a criminal prosecution’.54 The 
stated benefits of the civil penalty proceedings were that they are likely to be 
cheaper, more efficient, apply the rules of evidence less strictly, afford fewer 
                                                                                                                             
47  The maximum fine which can be imposed on an individual as a civil penalty for insider 
trading.  
48  The Petsas case, [14]. 
49  For further discussion of this issue, see Juliette Overland, ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step 
Back: Assessing Recent Developments in the Fight Against Insider Trading’ (2006) 24 
Company and Securities Law Journal 207.  
50  The Petsas case [17]. 
51  Middleton, above n 15; ASC v Donovan (1988) 28 ACSR 583, 608 per Cooper J; ASIC v Adler 
[2002] NSW SC 483, [125] per Santow J; ASIC v Whitlam [2002] NSWSC 718, [6] per Gzell  
J; ASIC v Forge [2002] NSWSC 760, [155] per Foster AJ; ASIC v Doyle [2002] WASC 223, 
[20].  
52  The Petsas case [18]. 
53  The Petsas case [19]. 
54  The Petsas case [1]. 
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protections to defendants, with a lower standard of proof, giving a greater 
likelihood of a successful action.55  
 
2  The Citigroup Case 
 
This is a controversial and much publicised set of proceedings, and was the second 
case instituted by the ASIC under the civil penalty regime for insider trading. The 
case is particularly significant because the defendant was a corporation, not an 
individual, and if the proceedings had been successful it would have been the first 
time a corporation had been found liable for insider trading in Australia. 
 
The ASIC instituted proceedings for insider trading against Citigroup on 31 March 
2006 and judgment was delivered by His Honour, Jacobson J, of the Federal Court 
of Australia on 28 June 2007. These proceedings arose out of the takeover bid for 
Patrick Corporation Limited (Patrick) by Toll Holdings Limited (Toll), in which 
Citigroup acted as an adviser to Toll through its Investment Banking Division. The 
ASIC had alleged that, on the day prior to the announcement of the takeover bid, 
Mr Manchee, a Citigroup employee who was engaged in proprietary share trading – 
that is, trading on Citigroup’s own behalf rather than for its clients – purchased over 
one million Patrick shares. This trading was noticed by the Investment Banking 
Division. An executive in the Investment Banking Division then asked Mr 
Manchee’s manager, Mr Darwell, who was undertaking the trading and, when told, 
stated words to the effect that ‘we may have a problem with that’. Mr Darwell took 
Mr Manchee outside and told him to stop buying Patrick shares. Mr Manchee then 
returned to the office and began selling Patrick shares.  
 
These circumstances gave rise to two claims of insider trading against Citigroup: 
 
1 the ASIC alleged that the proprietary trading by Mr Manchee, which 
occurred after he was told by his manager to stop buying Patrick shares, 
amounted to insider trading attributable to Citigroup; and 
 
2 the ASIC alleged that there was not an effective ‘Chinese wall’ in place so 
that all proprietary trading by Mr Manchee amounted to insider trading 
because of the inside information possessed by executives in the Investment 
Banking Division advising Toll on the proposed takeover of Patrick. 
 
The case also gave rise to issues of ‘conflict of interest’ management and breaches 
of fiduciary duties.56 
 
It is interesting to review the reasoning of Jacobson J on the relevant issues: 
 
                                                 
55  The Petsas case [2]. 
56  Jacobson J ultimately determined that there was no duty to avoid a conflict of interest because 
of the absence of a fiduciary relationship between Citigroup and Toll, but a discussion of those 
issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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(a)  The First Insider Trading Claim 
  
The first insider trading claim ultimately failed because the proprietary trader was 
not found to be an ‘officer’ of Citigroup – primarily because he was an employee 
not involved in management.57 Section 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 
provides that knowledge is attributed to a corporation if it is possessed by a 
company officer who acquired it in the course of their duties. Interestingly, 
Jacobson J chose not to consider any alternative common law rules which may 
operate to attribute knowledge to a corporation.58  
 
Additionally, as a matter of fact, it was found that the proprietary trader had not 
made the necessary supposition alleged by the ASIC – that Citigroup was acting for 
Toll on an imminent takeover of Patrick59 – and that such a supposition had not 
been conveyed to the proprietary trader by his manager.60 
 
(b)  The Second Insider Trading Claim 
 
The second insider trading claim ultimately failed because Citigroup’s ‘Chinese 
wall’ was found to satisfy the necessary requirements to defend an action for insider 
trading. Although officers of Citigroup, in the Investment Banking Division acting 
for Toll, were aware of relevant ‘inside information’ concerning Patrick shares, at a 
time when trading in those shares was occurring in another part of the organisation, 
the ‘Chinese wall’ was found to be effective.  
 
Section 1043F of the Corporations Act provides that a corporation does not 
contravene the insider trading prohibition merely because information is in the 
possession of an officer or employee if: 
 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its behalf 
by a person or persons other than that officer or employee; and  
(b) it had in operation at that time arrangements that could reasonably be 
expected to ensure that the information was not communicated to the person 
or persons who made the decision and that no advice with respect to the 
transaction or agreement was given to that person or any of those persons by a 
person in possession of the information; and 
(c) the information was not so communicated and no such advice was so given.  
 
Jacobson J found that Citigroup had an effective ‘Chinese wall’ in place and that 
there was no breach of the wall – thus no insider trading took place.61 
 
                                                 
57  The Citigroup case [479]-[515]. 
58  For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Juliette Overland, ‘There Was Movement at the 
Station for the Word had Passed Around: How does a Company Possess Inside Information 
under Australian Insider Trading Laws?’ (2006) 3 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 241. 
59  The Citigroup case [502]-[505]. 
60  The Citigroup case [516]-[525]. 
61  The Citigroup case [579]-[598]. 
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On matters of law, the Citigroup case also makes some interesting pronouncements 
on insider trading: 
 
1 it was stated that an uncommunicated supposition can constitute 
‘information’, as can inferences or suppositions drawn from words or 
conduct;62 
 
2 it gave confirmation that the test of whether information is readily observable 
is not whether the matter was widely observed but whether it could have 
been;63 and 
 
3 to have an effective ‘Chinese wall’ it is not necessary to achieve a ‘standard 
of absolute perfection’ or to ensure that ‘every conceivable risk is covered by 
written procedures’.64 
 
An interesting issue demonstrated by the Citigroup case is the fact that the ASIC 
was able to combine two separate causes of action – claims of insider trading and 
conflict of interest claims – in the one set of proceedings. As the claims arose from 
the same set of circumstances, this no doubt carried significant benefits for both 
sides as a result of the avoidance of duplication and overlap, despite the fact that the 
actions were ultimately unsuccessful. This would not have been possible if the civil 
penalty regime had not been introduced for insider trading – the insider trading case 
would have to have been run as a criminal prosecution by the Department of Public 
Prosecutions and the conflicts of interest claims as a separate civil action by the 
ASIC. Thus the ability for the ASIC to combine insider trading proceedings with 
other civil actions must be seen as an attendant benefit of the civil penalty regime 
for insider trading.  
 
IV  BACK TO THE FUTURE? – CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As has been discussed, in a practical sense, the financial services reform which has 
had the most noticeable effect on insider trading in Australia has been the extension 
of the civil penalty regime to insider trading.   
 
The extension of the insider trading prohibition to all Division 3 financial products 
has lead to concern over its operation in certain markets – particularly in relation to 
OTC derivative products. The CAMAC has not been united in its recommendations 
to deal with this issue and the Commonwealth Treasury has sought public 
submissions. The date for responses to the Insider Trading Position and 
Consultation Paper closed on 2 June 2007 and a report from the Treasury has not 
yet been released, but it is hoped that the uncertainty surrounding the operation of 
insider trading in the OTC markets can be satisfactorily clarified.  
 
                                                 
62  The Citigroup case [542]. 
63  The Citigroup case [551]. 
64  The Citigroup case [591]-[592]. 
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The widening of the scope of the conduct caught by the insider trading prohibition 
has closed one loophole but opened another. Although a situation similar to that 
arising in the Evans and Doyle case – where the placing of a ‘buy’ order on SEATS 
was found to fall outside the prohibition - would now be avoided, the placing of a 
‘sell’ order alone still appears to unregulated. However, this loophole will be closed 
if the CAMAC recommendation is adopted so that the Corporations Act is amended 
to provide that, if a person instructs an intermediary to act on their behalf, the 
relevant time at which liability arises is the time at which the intermediary is 
instructed. 
  
Despite the ASIC’s lack of success in the Citigroup case, the availability of civil 
penalty proceedings against alleged insider traders is still likely to lead to an 
increase in the number of proceedings instituted in the near future and may still lead 
to an ‘invigoration of litigation for insider trading’.65 It clearly provides more 
options for the ASIC when confronted with complex insider trading cases, even 
though criminal proceedings may remain the preferred option due to the great 
symbolic value of criminal sanctions.66 One issue that has been highlighted by the 
Citigroup case is that whilst civil penalty proceedings have certain advantages over 
criminal prosecutions, which make it easier to proceed against alleged insider 
traders, they do not resolve all problematic issues concerning insider trading. 
Indeed, the Citigroup case can be said to demonstrate that even with the benefits of 
civil penalty proceedings, the complexities and technicalities associated with 
pursuing alleged insider traders remain – difficulties in detecting insider trading; 
complexity of insider trading laws and interpretational difficulties; limited judicial 
consideration of insider trading laws and inconsistent judicial interpretation; and in 
particular the difficulty in proving the knowledge elements of the offence.67 
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